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Abstract: As social robots are increasingly introduced
into health interventions, one potential area where they
might prove valuable is in supporting people’s psycholo-
gical health through conversation. Given the importance
of self-disclosure for psychological health, this study as-
sessed the viability of using social robots for eliciting rich
disclosures that identify needs and emotional states in
human interaction partners. Three within-subject experi-
ments were conducted with participants interacting with
another person, a humanoid social robot, and a disem-
bodied conversational agent (voice assistant). We per-
formed a number of objective evaluations of disclosures
to these three agents via speech content and voice ana-
lyses and also probed participants’ subjective evaluations
of their disclosures to three agents. Our findings suggest
that participants overall disclose more to humans than
artificial agents, that agents’ embodiment influences dis-
closure quantity and quality, and that people are gener-
ally aware of differences in their personal disclosures to
three agents studied here. Together, the findings set the
stage for further investigation into the psychological un-
derpinnings of self-disclosures to artificial agents and
their potential role in eliciting disclosures as part of
mental and physical health interventions.
Keywords: social robots, human–robot interaction, self-
disclosure, voice assistant, voice analysis, embodiment
1 Introduction
People tend to disclose thoughts and feelings with others,
especially when experiencing unique and challenging life
events [1]. Disclosure thus serves an evolutionary function
of strengthening interpersonal relationships but also pro-
duces a wide variety of health benefits, including helping
people to copewith stress and traumatic events and to elicit
help and support [2–4]. Moreover, self-disclosure appears
to play a critical role in successful health treatment out-
comes [5] andhas a positive impact onmental and physical
health [6]. Given the importance of self-disclosure for psy-
chological health, here we are interested in assessing the
viability of using social robots for eliciting rich disclosures
to identify people’s needs and emotional states.
Social robots, defined here as autonomous machines
that interact and communicate with humans or other agents
by following social behaviours and rules [7], are gradually
being introduced in psychosocial health interventions [8] as
well as in mental health and well-being research [9]. Con-
currently, social robot-based interventions are also being
introduced into care settings and tasked with providing
physical assistance (e.g. ref. [10–15]), serving as compa-
nions, providing emotional support, and contributing to
the mental well-being of patients (e.g. ref. [8,9,16–21]).
Autonomous systems such as social robots can support
care recipients in a variety of ways but also support their
caregivers’ physical and mental health (see ref. [22]). More-
over, social robots are increasingly being built equipped
with technologies (e.g. sensors, cameras, and recorders)
that promote high-fidelity data collection and online, on-
going analysis of a human interaction partner’s behaviour.
When implemented in an ethical and responsible manner,
such features hold promise for robots being able to analyse
and respond to user responses during an interaction in a
sensitive, timely, and nuanced manner.
In order for health interventions to succeed, they de-
pend on open channels of communication where indivi-
duals can disclose needs and emotions, from which a lis-
tener can identify stressors and respondaccordingly [23,24].
This is particularly important for self-help autonomous
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systems, and for personalizing interventions and other
assistive solutions, as these should be able to use the
rich input provided by human users to extract salient in-
formation, identify patterns and emotional states, and re-
spond accordingly [25]. It follows from this that socially
assistive robots should also be attuned to the content and
emotion of disclosed information. While social robots and
other artificial agents do not (yet) offer the same opportu-
nities as humans for social interactions [26], their cognitive
architectures and embodied cognition can nonetheless elicit
socially meaningful behaviours from humans [27–29]. Ac-
cordingly, people infer a great deal about what an agent
does or is capable of doing, based on its embodiment (i.e.
what it looks like, its physical presence, how it moves, etc.).
Inaddition,other cuesof embodimentaredrivenbyahuman
interaction partner’s cognitive reconstruction [30], wherein
their beliefs or expectations about an agent further shape
perception and behaviour [31–34].
However, a number of outstanding questions remain
regarding the utility and scope ofusing social robots in self-
disclosure settings,which require careful evaluationbefore
such agents might be deployed in actual care contexts. For
instance, it remains unclear the extent towhich individuals
convey emotions and personal information in disclosures
to social robots aswell as howdisclosures to artificial agents
differ depending on the agent’s embodiment or physical
presence. As socially assistive robots continue to be devel-
oped with the aim to provide meaningful support to people
across a variety of contexts, our goal with this study was to
explore how a social robot’s embodiment influences peo-
ple’s disclosures in measurable terms, and how these dis-
closures differ from disclosures made to humans and dis-
embodied agents. Hence, our primary research question
concerns the extent to which disclosures to social robots
differ from disclosures to humans and disembodied agents.
1.1 Embodiment as a social cue
Themedia richness theory (MRT) [35] explains that a com-
munication medium’s ability to reproduce information
sent through it is driven by its ability to communicate a
complex message adequately. Hence, personal communi-
cation behaviours, such as disclosure, would typically be
transmitted better (or with greater fidelity) through media
with the capacity to convey richer social cues, such as
gestures and body language [35,36]. However, MRT was
originally concerned with computer-mediated communi-
cation (CMC), and accordingly, social cueswithin theMRT
framework are bound to human origins. In this study, we
address this in the context of human–robot interaction
(HRI) and explore people’s disclosures as a reaction to
agents’ physical features, when these are the only avail-
able cues to an agent’s intentions. Therefore, we ask
whether an agent’s embodiment influences people’s dis-
closures to them, in terms of both objective and subjective
measurements of disclosure quality.
Within the MRT framework [35], the complexity of a
communication message is related to the task and the
context of the interaction but not the content of the inter-
action. Carlson and Zmud [36] expanded on this and ex-
plained that the topic of the interaction also has a sub-
stantial impact on how one experience the interaction, and
accordingly, respond and communicate. Therefore, we are
also asking how disclosures differ in relation to the agents’
embodiment in comparison with the disclosure topic.
1.2 Subjective and objective disclosure
Self-disclosure has been studied and conceptualized in
the psychological literature in many ways and has been
assessed using different instruments that measure its dif-
ferent dimensions [37]. Self-reported measurements (e.g.
ref. [38,39]) convey subjective dimensions of self-disclo-
sure evaluating people’s retrospective perceptions [37,40],
whereas objective dimensions of disclosure include depth,
breadth, and volume of a disclosure [41,42] from verbal
output [37,43,44]. Moreover, vocal prosody features and
voice signals provide implicit indicators to behaviour and
emotions [45–48], and the psychophysiological underpin-
nings that associate with these (e.g. ref. [47,49–52]).
Single dimensions cannot capture the complex nature
of self-disclosure, as it is a multidimensional behaviour
[37]; perceptions of self-disclosure can be objectively ob-
served differently from behaviour and content [53]. Sev-
eralHRI studies have addressed artificial agents’ influence
on disclosure (e.g. ref. [20,54–69]); however, evidence is
limited regarding how people’s subjective perceptions of
self-disclosure align with objective measures of self-dis-
closure. Here we evaluate both people’s perceptions and
their actual disclosures across three experiments.
1.3 Current study
In our study, we are primarily interested in the extent to
which disclosures to social robots differ from disclosures to
humans and disembodied conversational agents. Further-
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more, we investigate how disclosures differ in relation to
the agent’s embodiment in comparison with the disclosure
topic. We wish to explore and describe differences in sub-
jective and objective disclosures to social robots and how
people’s perceptions and their actual disclosures are related
across three experiments. Disclosure is important in order
for a person to benefit fully from an automated assistant,
which should be able to recognize commands and tasks, as
well as respond appropriately to a human user’s needs,
emotions, and psychological state.
We conducted three laboratory experiments to address
researchquestions centeredon this topic. Experiment 1was
designed toprovide an initial indication andbaseline result
regarding subjective and objective disclosures to social ro-
bots (see ref. [70]). Experiment 2 replicated the design of
Experiment 1with a sample ofnativeEnglish speakers only.
In Experiment 3, we replicated the experimental design
again, this time with a larger sample size for greater statis-
tical power, which enabled us to further probe the relia-
bility and generalizability of the findings from the first two
experiments.
2 Method
Consistent with recent proposals [71,72], we report how
we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, all
manipulations, and all measures in the study. In addi-
tion, following open science initiatives (e.g. ref. [73]), the
de-identified data sets, stimuli, and analysis code asso-
ciated with this study are freely available online (https://
osf.io/f3d5b/). By making the data available, we enable
and encourage others to pursue tests of alternative
hypotheses, as well as more exploratory analyses.
In order to address our primary research questions,
three laboratory experiments were conducted. Preliminary
results of the first experiment were reported as late breaking
reports in the Human–Robot Interaction conference (HRI)
2020 (see ref. [70]).
2.1 Population
2.1.1 Experiment 1
The first experiment consisted of 26 university students be-
tween the ages of 17 and 42 years ( = = )M 24.42, SD 6.40 ,
including 61.5% females. Participants reported being from
different national backgrounds, with 50% of participants
reporting English as their native language. For most parti-
cipants (88.50%), this was their first interaction with a
robot. All participants were recruited using the University
of Glasgow’s participant pool. Participants provided written
informed consent before takingpart in any studyprocedures
and were compensated for their time with either course
credits or cash (£3 for 30min of participation). All study
procedures were approved by the research ethics committee
of the University of Glasgow.
2.1.2 Experiment 2
Following the first experiment, the target population of
the second experiment was limited to native English
speakers. This was highlighted in the advert that was
shared over email to potential participants, on the advert
in the University of Glasgow’s subject pool, and only po-
tential participants who were defined as native English
speakers in the subject-pool system could sign up to par-
ticipate in the study. Participants from the previous ex-
periment (Experiment 1) were excluded from partici-
pating in Experiment 2.
The participant sample for Experiment 2 consisted of
27 participants between the ages of 20 and 62 years
( = = )M 28.60, SD 9.61 , including 59.30% females. All
of the participants reported English as their native lan-
guage, whereas 85.20% of the participants reported being
from the United Kingdom, 11.10% reported being from
other English-speaking countries, and 3.70% (one partici-
pant) reported being from Chile. For most of the partici-
pants (81.50%), thiswas theirfirst interactionwith a robot.
The participants were recruited using The University of
Glasgow’s subject pool or by being directly contacted by
the researchers. All of the participants provided written
informed consent before taking part in any study proce-
dures, and the participants were compensated for their
time with either credits or cash (£3 for 30 minutes of par-
ticipation). All study procedures were approved by the
research ethics committee of the University of Glasgow.
2.1.3 Experiment 3
Following the first and second experiments, the target
population of the third experiment was limited to native
English speakers. This was highlighted in the adverts
shared over email to potential participants and on the
University of Glasgow’s subject pool, and only native
English speakers in the subject-pool system could sign
up to participate in the study. Participants from Experi-
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ments 1 and 2 were excluded from participating in Experi-
ment 3.
The study consisted of 65 participants, of which 4 were
excluded due to technical failures. The 61 participants were
between the ages of 18 and 43 years( = = )M 23.02, SD 4.88 ,
including 67.20% females. All of the participants reported
English as their native language, whereas 63.70% of the
participants reported being from the United Kingdom,
16.30% reported being from other English speaking coun-
tries, and 19.5% reported being from non-English speaking
countries. For most of the participants (72.10%), this was
their first interaction with a robot. The participants were
recruited using The University of Glasgow’s subject pool
or by being directly contacted by the researchers. All of
the participants provided written informed consent before
taking part in any study procedures and participants were
compensated for their time with either credits or with cash
(£3 for 30 minutes of participation). All study procedures
were approved by a research ethics committee of the
University of Glasgow.
2.2 Design
Three laboratory experiments consisted of within-subject
experimental designs with three treatments, applying a
round robin test. In a randomized order, all participants
interacted with three agents: (1) a humanoid social robot,
(2) a human agent, and (3) a disembodied agent (voice
assistant).
In Experiment 1, participants were asked one ques-
tion from each agent about one of three topics that were
relevant to a student’s experience (Section 2.6.1). Based
on our experience and observations from running Experi-
ment 1, as well as qualitative feedback received from
participants, we decided to update and improve some
aspects of our experimental approach when running Ex-
periment 2. As our participant sample was not limited to
students in Experiment 2 (see Section 2.6.2) and Experi-
ment 3 (see Section 2.6.3), participants were asked two
questions by each agent about one of three more general
topics. In Experiment 2, the topics surveyed the same
ideas as Experiment 1, but were not constrained to the
context of student experience. Based on our observations
and participants’ feedback from Experiment 2, we de-
signed Experiment 3 to collect data from a larger sample
size. To optimize disclosure and ensure the data collected
could extend the results of the previous experiments, we
streamlined our questions so that multiple questions that
were similar were combined into a single question.
The rationale behind the slight variations present
across the three experiments that compose the present
study was to (a) improve the experimental design (i.e.
ask more questions) following each experiment; (b) adapt
questions based on participants feedback, our observa-
tions, and the participant sample being recruited; and (c)
provide evidence that even though the exact content of
the questions changed across experiments, the effect of
embodiment on key factors of self-disclosure endured
compared to the effects of the topics of the disclosure.
2.3 Stimuli
Three agents communicated the same questions using
different visual and verbal cues that corresponded appro-
priately to their form and capabilities. The same experi-
menter (G.L.) operated the Wizard of Oz (WoZ) of both
devices (the humanoid social robot and the disembodied
agent) via dedicated software and also served as the
human agent for all three experiments. The questions
were pre-scripted and integrated into the WoZ systems
to minimize any possibility of mistakes and errors. Each
agent asked question equally across all three experi-
ments, as per random assignment.
2.3.1 Humanoid social robot
This treatment condition used the robot NAO (Softbank
Robotics), a human-like social robot that can communicate
with humans via speech and can also be programmed to
display appropriate gaze and body gesture cues to increase
its appearance of “socialness” (see Figure 1). NAO commu-
nicated with participants in this study via the WoZ tech-
nique controlled by the experimenter via a PC laptop. All of
the pre-scripted questions and speech items were written
and coded in the WoZ system, with the experimenter (G.L.)
controlling NAO by pressing buttons on a PC laptop. Ac-
cordingly, the procedure followed clear pre-programmed
protocol where the experimenter did not need to speak or
type anything during the interaction but only press a button
to start the interaction.
In the first and second experiments, when partici-
pants were answering NAO questions, NAO directed its
gaze towards the participant and engaged in simulated
breathing to contribute to its human-like embodiment.
When speaking, NAO communicated using expressive
and animated body language that corresponded to the
spoken content and NAO’s physical capabilities. NAO’s
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movements were self-initiated based on NAO’s demo
software.
In the third experiment, NAOwas further programmed
to nod its head every few seconds when “listening” to the
humanparticipant speak. This changewas implemented to
reduce the variance in embodiment/listener cues between
the humanoid social robot and the human agent.
NAO’s joints are often noisy, and since this sort of
noise is not ambient, it can be captured as an acoustic
sound. Therefore, when participants were talking, NAOs’
animated movements were limited to simulated breathing
and gentle head nods to reduce the chance of noise coming
from NAOs’ joints.
2.3.2 Human agent
This treatment consists of the experimenter (G.L.) as an
elicitor, taking an active part in the experimental manip-
ulation. This treatment was naturally manipulated by the
agents human looks, voice, and gestures (e.g. nodding;
see Figure 2). The human gestures were not planned or
controlled and followed his natural embodiment and be-
haviour to ensure that his body language will stay natural
and will correspond to the embodiment of human com-
munication patterns. However, the experimenter did not
speak when participants were answering questions, to
more closely reflect the conversation scenarios with the
other two agents. This treatment was identical in all of
three experiments and the questions asked by the human
agent followed the same script when communicating
the questions. In order to draw causal inferences and to
be able to claim that there were no anecdotal deviations
in the agents’ behaviour or communication that might
affect the results, the human agent had to be a bit more
“robotic” and follow a script, like an actor. At the same
time, the same script that the human agent used was also
used by the humanoid social robot and the disembodied
agent, thus minimising any confounding gross commu-
nication differences between the agents.
2.3.3 Disembodied agent
This treatment condition featured a “Google Nest Mini”
voice assistant. A voice assistant is a particular software
in a speaker (in the context of this study, a “Google Nest
Mini” device). It has a minimal physical presence and is
disembodied, in that it is not designed for visual interac-
tion (i.e. it does not demonstrate any sort of visual cues),
and its verbal cues are limited to clear manifest cues
(“I understand” and “Okay, I see”), rather than natural
implicit cues (e.g. “ahh” and “amm;” see Figure 3). The
voice assistant was also controlled by the experimenter
(G.L.) via the WoZ technique. All questions and speech
items were written and coded to a “ColorNote” applica-
tion on an Android tablet. Using Bluetooth technology
and Android’s accessibility “select to speak” feature,
the experimenter controlled the disembodied voice assis-
tant by streaming questions and speech items to partici-
pants. Accordingly, the procedure followed clear pre-pro-
grammed protocol where the experimenter did not need
to speak or type anything during the interaction but only
press a button to start the interaction. The device was
used as a Bluetooth speaker, and the Wi-Fi function of
the device and the microphone were disabled to maintain
Figure 1: Illustration of experimental set up for talking to a huma-
noid social robot.
Figure 2: Illustration of experimental set up for talking to the human
agent.
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participants’ privacy. Participants were explicitly told
that the disembodied agent’s software was developed by
the lab and has no connection to Google, and the device’s
Wi-Fi function is not working.
2.4 Measurements
2.4.1 Subjective self-disclosure
Participants were requested to report their level of subjec-
tive self-disclosure via the sub-scale of work and studies
disclosure in Jourard’s Self-Disclosure Questionnaire [38].
This questionnaire was adapted and adjusted for the con-
text of the study, addressing the statements to student ex-
perience in the first experiment, and general life experiences
in the second and third experiments. The measurement in-
cluded ten self-reported items for which participants
reported the extent to which they disclosed information to
one of the agents on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a great
extent). The scale was found to be reliable in Experiments 1,
2, and 3 when applied to all of the agents. In the second
experiment, the reliability score of the scale when applied to
the human agent was only moderate (Table 1).
2.4.2 Disclosure content
The recordingswere automatically processedusing a speech
recognition package for Python [74]. The text was manually
checked and fixed by the researchers to ensure it corre-
sponded accurately to the recordings. The following mea-
surements were extracted from the recordings’ content:
– Length of the disclosure: The volume of disclosure in
terms of the number of words per disclosure. The
number of words per disclosure was extracted from
the text using a simple length command on Python.
– Compound sentiment: Using Vader for Python [75], the
disclosures were measured to determine their overall
sentiment in terms of positive, neutral, and negative
sentiment. The compound sentiment evaluates a dis-
closure sentiment from negative (−1) to positive (+1),
based on the calculated sentiment score [75].
– Sentimentality: The ratio of overall demonstrated senti-
ment, positive andnegative, in eachdisclosure. Thiswas
calculated based on the combined scores of Vaders’ [75]
positive and negative sentiments.
2.4.3 Voice acoustics features
Basic prosody features are conveyed with changes in
pitch, voice intensity, harmonicity, duration, speech rate,
and pauses [44,76,77]. For the scope of this study, we
decided to focus on the following fundamental features
for demonstrating basic differences in voice production
and changes mean values of fundamental voice signals
within a disclosure.
The features were extracted and processed using
Parselmouth [78], a Python library for Praat [79]. The ex-
tracted features were:
– Mean pitch – in hertz (Hz).
– Mean harmonicity – the degree of acoustic periodicity
in decibels (dB).
– Mean intensity – the loudness of the sound wave in dB.
– Energy – air pressure in voice, measured as the square
of the amplitudemultiplied by the duration of the sound.
– Duration of speech in seconds.
Figure 3: Illustration of experimental set up for talking to the voice
assistant (Google Nest Mini).
Table 1: Reliability scores, means, and standard deviations of
subjective self-disclosure scales across three experiments
Treatment
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Subjective self-disclosure
α M SD α M SD α M SD
Robot 0.94 3.30 1.56 0.78 3.87 0.88 0.84 3.26 1.02
Human 0.91 3.76 1.59 0.68 4.12 0.82 0.85 3.63 1.10
DA 0.90 2.84 1.35 0.87 2.97 1.07 0.88 2.98 1.13
Total - 3.30 1.53 - 3.65 1.04 - 3.29 1.11
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2.4.4 Other variables
– Agency and experience: Research into mind percep-
tion entails that agency (the ability of the agent to
plan and act) and experience (the ability of the agent
to sense and feel) are the two key dimensions when
valuing an agent’s mind [80]. To determine whether a
difference in mind perception emerged between the
agents, after each interaction participants were re-
quested to evaluate the agent in terms of experience
and agency, after being introduced to these terms
(adapted from ref. [80]). Both concepts were evaluated
by the participants using a 0 to 100 rating bar.
– Perceived stress scale: This scalewas added to the second
and third experiments. Participants were requested to re-
port their periodic stress on ten statement items of the
perceived stress scale [81], evaluating these on a scale of
1 (never) to 5 (very often). The scale was found to be reli-
able in the second ( =α 0.93, =M 2.76, =SD 0.92), and
third ( =α 0.88, =M 3, =SD 0.73) experiments.
– Extraversion: This measurement was added to the third
and final experiment. Participants were asked to rank
their extraversion on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 9 (very
applicable) on the 8 extraversion items of the Mini-
Markers Big Five personality scale [82]. The scale was
found reliable ( =α 0.86, =M 5.58, =SD 1.43).
– Demographics: Participants across all three experiments
were requested to complete a short questionnaire that
gathered information on demographic parameters in-
cluding age, biological sex, gender identification, level
of education, nationality, job, previous experience with
robots, and whether English is their native language.
2.5 Instruments and data preparation
The audio data were recorded using UMT800 by Microtech
Gefell, a microphone known for its high sensitivity and
outstanding signal-to-noise ratio. We used this device in
an acoustic recording laboratory to ensure high quality of
audio recordings and minimize any potential effect of
noise. We reduced the microphone sensitivity by 10 dB to
ensure that loud noises coming from the floor would not be
amplified, ensuring that we were able to capture each par-
ticipant’s voice over any other sources of noise.We ensured
that the agents were far enough from the microphone so
that any other potential source of noise coming from the
agents (e.g. the sound of the robot’s motors) did not sup-
press or otherwise interfere with each participant’s voice.
When processing the recordings, we reduced noise
by using spectral subtraction noise reduction method
[83] for reducing the spectral effects of acoustically added
noise in speech. A sample of recordings was manually
checked to make sure that there is no apparent noise
when participants speak and during silent breaks.
2.6 Procedure
All three experiments took place in a sound-isolated re-
cording laboratory at the Institute of Neuroscience and
Psychology at the University of Glasgow (see Figure 4).
The recording roomwas completely soundproof to ensure
the highest possible sound quality for the recordings to
facilitate offline analyses. The participants booked their
desired time slot for participation using the University of
Glasgow subject-pool website and were picked up by one
of the experimenters from the building’s waiting room.
The experiment took approximately 30min per partici-
pant. In the first and third experiments, a single experi-
menter (G.L.) operated all the experimental procedures;
and in the second experiment, two experimenters (G.L.
and J.N.G.) operated the experimental procedure. The ex-
perimenter(s) sat near a desk outside of the recording
room, where the participant could not see them. How-
ever, the recording room had a window that provided
both parties the option to communicate with each other
if needed. The experiment was administered using a
“formR” application [84,85] that randomized the treat-
ments automatically.
All participants across all three experiments received
the same introduction and were told that the humanoid
social robot and the disembodied agent were functioning
autonomously, and that while we were indeed recording
the interaction, and planned to use the data for the ana-
lysis, it would be fully anonymized and the experimenter(s)
would not actively listen to their disclosures when talking
to the robot and the disembodied agent. The participants
were further told that the experimenter(s)will only actively
listen during their disclosures with the robot and the
disembodied agent in case during the interaction, there
will be no indication of sound from the recording booth
(and then the experimenter(s) would need to check in on
them and the agent to see whether there was a technical
failure or if the participant stopped talking for a specific
reason), or in case the participant actively tries to reach
the experimenters attention through the window. The
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experimenters were following the interaction using sound
indication from the recording booth. Participants were ex-
plicitly told that the disembodied agent’s software was
developed by the lab and has no connection to Google,
and the device’s Wi-Fi function is not working.
After each interaction participants were requested to
evaluate the agent in terms of agency and experience. In
the first and second experiments, after all interactions,
participants evaluated their perceived self-disclosure [38]
to each of the agents. In the third experiment, after each
interaction, participants evaluated their perceived self-
disclosure to each of the agents via the same instrument
[38]. Finally, after all interactions, participants were re-
quested to complete a short questionnaire, reporting de-
mographic parameters, and their previous experience
with robots (see Section 2.4.4). In the second and third
experiments, participants then answered the perceived
stress scale [81]; and in the third experiment, participants
also answered the extraversion items of the Mini-Markers
Big Five personality scale [82].
Upon completing the experimental procedures, par-
ticipants were debriefed about the aims of the study and
told that the robot and the disembodied agent were pre-
programmed. Then participants received payment of £3
(equivalent to £6/hour of participation) or the equivalent
number of participation credits. All interactions between
participants and agents (humanoid social robot/human/dis-
embodied agent)were audiorecorded for analysis purposes,
extracting content and acoustic features from the audiofiles.
2.6.1 Experiment 1
All participants interacted with each of three agents, and
the order of interaction was randomly assigned across
participants. They were asked one question from each
agent about each of three topics: (1) academic assess-
ment, (2) student finances, and (3) university–life bal-
ance. The questions were randomly ordered and allo-
cated to the agents. All questions were the same across
the agent treatments.
2.6.2 Experiment 2
As with the first experiment, all participants interacted
with all agents in a randomized order. Participants were
asked two questions by each agent: (1) work situation,
(2) financial habits, (3) social life, (4) family matters,
(5) romantic relationships, and (6) hobbies and spare
time. The questions were randomly ordered and allocated
to the agents. The questions were grouped into three
Figure 4: The experiment settings at the sound-isolated recording laboratory.
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topics: (1) work and finances (questions 1 and 2), (2) so-
cial life and leisure time (questions 3 and 6), and (3)
intimate and family relationships (questions 4 and 5).
All questions were the same across the agent treatments.
2.6.3 Experiment 3
As with the first and second experiments, participants in
Experiment 3 interacted with all three agents, in a rando-
mized order. Participants were asked two questions by
each agent about each of three topics: (1) work and life
balance (one question about ones work situation, and one
question about their spare time and hobbies), (2) relation-
ships and social life (one question about ones closest re-
lationships, and one question about socializing habits),
and (3) physical and mental health (one question about
habits of sustaining physical health, and one question
about habits of sustaining/treating mental health). The
topics were randomly allocated to the agents, and the
questions within each topic were randomly ordered. All
questions were the same across the agent treatments.
3 Results
3.1 Differences in agency and experience
Doubly multivariate analysis of variance was conducted
for each of the experiments to determine whether a dif-
ference in agency and experience emerged within the
different agents (humanoid social robot vs human vs dis-
embodied agent).
3.1.1 Experiment 1
The model was found to be statistically significant, Wilk’s
=Λ 0.15, <p 0.001, suggesting that a difference emerged
in the combined value of agency and experience across
three agents. The agents’ treatments elicited statistically
significant large differences in people’s perceptions of
the agents sense of agency, ( )F 2, 50 = 16.32, <p 0.001,
=ω 0.282 , and the agents’ demonstration of experience,
( )F 1.61, 40.17 = 48.91, <p 0.001, =ω 0.552 . Post hoc ana-
lyses using Bonferroni correction revealed that people per-
ceived a human to have higher agency and experience
than a humanoid social robot and a disembodied agent
(see Figures 5 and 6). The difference in people’s percep-
tions of agency between a humanoid social robot and a
disembodied agent was not statistically significant (see
Figure 5). People perceived a humanoid social robots to
demonstrate higher levels of experience compared to a
disembodied agent (see Figure 6).
3.1.2 Experiment 2
The model was found to be statistically significant, Wilk’s
=Λ 0.14, <p 0.001, suggesting that a difference emerged
in the combined value of agency and experience across
three agents. The agents’ treatments elicited statistically
significant large differences in people’s perceptions of the
agents sense of agency, ( )F 1.61, 41.86 = 21.71, <p 0.001,
=ω 0.342 , and the agents’ demonstration of experience,
( )F 2, 52 = 79.20, <p 0.001, =ω 0.662 . Post hoc analyses
using Bonferroni correction revealed that people perceived
a human to have higher agency and experience than a
Figure 6: Mean score of experience perceptions reported for each
agent across three experiments. The error bars represent 95% CI of
the mean score of experience perceptions.
Figure 5: Mean score of agency perceptions reported for each agent
across three experiments. The error bars represent 95% CI of the
mean score of agency perceptions.
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humanoid social robot and a disembodied agent (see
Figures 5 and 6). Moreover, people perceived a humanoid
social robot to have higher agency than a disembodied
agent (see Figure 5). Finally, people perceived a humanoid
social robots to demonstrate higher levels of experience
compared to a disembodied agent (see Figure 6).
3.1.3 Experiment 3
The model was found to be statistically significant, Wilk’s
=Λ  0.11, <p 0.001, suggesting that a difference emerged
in the combined value of agency and experience across
three agents. The agents’ treatments elicited statistically
significant large differences in people’s perceptions of
the agents sense of agency, ( )F 2, 120 = 77.33, <p 0.001,
=ω 0.462 , and the agents’ demonstration of experience,
( )F 1.79, 107.40 = 197.93, <p 0.001, =ω 0.682 . Post hoc
analyses using Bonferroni correction revealed that people
perceived a human to have higher agency and experience
than a humanoid social robot and a disembodied agent
(see Figures 5 and 6). Moreover, people perceived a hu-
manoid social robot to have higher agency than a disem-
bodied agent (see Figure 5). Finally, people perceived
a humanoid social robots to demonstrate higher levels of
experience compared to a disembodied agent (seeFigure 6).
3.2 The effect of agents on disclosure
Doubly multivariate analysis of variance was conducted
for each of the experiments to determine whether a dif-
ference in disclosure emerged within the different agents
(humanoid social robot vs human vs disembodied agent),
measured in terms of subjective self-disclosure and ob-
jective disclosure (length of the disclosure, compound
sentiment, sentimentality, pitch, harmonicity, intensity,
energy, and duration of the disclosures).
3.2.1 Experiment 1
The model was found to be statistically significant, Wilk’s
=Λ 0.06, <p 0.001, suggesting that a difference emerged
in the combined disclosure (in terms of subjective and
objective disclosure) across three agents.
The agents’ treatments elicited statistically signifi-
cant medium to large differences in subjective self-dis-
closure. Univariate tests revealed statistically non-
Table 2: Univariate Results with agents’ embodiment as repeated measures treatment
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Treatment Agents
Variable df F p ω2 df F p ω2 df F p ω2
Subjective
self-disclosure
(1.37, 34.13) 6.34 0.010* 0.12 (1.66, 43.06) 17.28 0.001*** 0.29 (1.84, 110.50) 12.47 0.001*** 0.11
Length (1.26, 31.57) 2.55 0.114 0.04 (1.36, 35.42) 18.60 0.001*** 0.30 (2, 120) 12.87 0.001*** 0.12
Compound
sentiment
(1.35, 33.62) 0.39 0.596 −0.02 (2, 52) 5.90 0.005** 0.11 (1.79, 107.24) 0.46 0.613 −0.01
Sentimentality (2, 50) 0.06 0.943 −0.03 (1.65, 42.78) 0.40 0.636 −0.02 (1.85, 110.77) 1.57 0.213 0.01
Pitch (1.65, 41.16) 2.57 0.098 0.04 (1.62, 42.02) 7.77 0.003** 0.14 (1.55, 93) 76.49 0.001*** 0.45
Harmonicity (2, 50) 2.12 0.131 0.03 (2, 52) 13.60 0.001*** 0.24 (2, 120) 22.75 0.001*** 0.19
Intensity (2, 50) 2.08 0.135 0.03 (2, 52) 1.73 0.188 0.02 (1.48, 88.64) 2.09 0.143 0.01
Energy (1.23, 30.79) 1.70 0.204 0.02 (1.07, 27.73) 1.05 0.319 0.00 (1, 60.02) 1.09 0.300 0.00
Duration (1.19, 29.71) 1.22 0.287 0.01 (1.38, 35.84) 12.70 0.001*** 0.22 (2, 120) 4.85 0.009** 0.04
* = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001.
Figure 7: Mean score of subjective self-disclosure towards each
agent across three experiments. The error bars represent 95% CI of
the mean score of subjective self-disclosure across participants.
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Table 3: Estimated marginal means and multiple pairwise comparisons between the agents
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Variable M (SE) 95% CI M ( )SE 95% CI M ( )SE 95% CI
Subjective self-disclosure
Robot 3.30 (0.31) [2.67, 3.94] 3.87 (0.17) [3.52, 4.22] 3.26 (0.13) [3.00, 3.52]
Difference to human −0.46 (0.17)* [−0.90, −0.01] −0.25 (0.15) [−0.64, 0.14] −0.37 (0.13)* [−0.69, −0.06]
Human 3.76 (0.31) [3.12, 4.40] 4.12 (0.16) [3.80, 4.44] 3.63 (0.14) [3.35, 3.91]
Difference to DA 0.93 (0.33)* [0.08, 1.78] 1.14 (0.20)*** [0.62, 1.67] 0.65 (0.15)*** [0.28, 1.02]
DA 2.84 (0.27) [2.29, 3.38] 2.97 (0.21) [2.55, 3.40] 2.98 (0.15) [2.69, 3.27]
Difference to robot −0.47 (0.25) [−1.12, 0.18] −0.90 (0.25)** [−1.53, −0.26] −0.27 (0.11) [−0.55, 0.00]
Length
Robot 96.50 (22.57) [50.03, 142.97] 46.15 (3.86) [38.22, 54.08] 85.83 (10.65) [64.52, 107.14]
Difference to human −35.23 (20.52) [−87.89, 17.43] −42.52 (9.52)*** [−66.87, −18.17] −41.41 (10.18)*** [−66.49, −16.33]
Human 131.73 (27.50) [75.09, 188.37] 88.67 (10.04) [68.03, 109.31] 127.24 (10.05) [107.13, 147.35]
Difference to DA 41.50 (25.27) [−23.34, 106.34] 41.63 (8.91)*** [18.84, 64.42] 42.71 (9.26)*** [19.91, 65.51]
DA 90.23 (16.18) [56.92, 123.54] 47.04 (5.25) [36.25, 57.82] 84.53 (8.26) [68, 101.05]
Difference to robot −6.27 (10.97) [−34.42, 21.88] 0.89 (4.53) [−10.70, 12.48] −1.30 (9.27) [−24.12, 21.52]
Compound sentiment
Robot 0.64 (0.08) [0.47, 0.80] 0.67 (0.05) [0.57, 0.77] 0.76 (0.04) [0.69, 0.84]
Difference to human −0.08 (0.11) [−0.36, 0.20] −0.11 (0.07) [−0.28, 0.07] −0.04 (0.06) [−0.18, 0.09]
Human 0.72 (0.08) [0.55, 0.89] 0.78 (0.05) [0.67, 0.88] 0.81 (0.04) [0.73, 0.88]
Difference to DA 0.06 (0.11) [−0.23, 0.35] 0.25 (0.07)** [0.07, 0.44] 0.01 (0.04) [−0.09, 0.11]
DA 0.65 (0.08) [0.49, 0.82] 0.52 (0.07) [0.39, 0.66] 0.80 (0.03) [0.74, 0.85]
Difference to robot 0.02 (0.05) [−0.12, 0.15] −0.15 (0.08) [−0.36, 0.06] 0.03 (0.04) [−0.07, 0.14]
Sentimentality
Robot 0.18 (0.02) [0.13, 0.22] 0.25 (0.02) [0.21, 0.29] 0.29 (0.01) [0.27, 0.31]
Difference to human −0.01 (0.02) [−0.07, 0.05] 0.02 (0.02) [−0.03, 0.07] 0.02 (0.01) [−0.01, 0.05]
Human 0.18 (0.02) [0.15, 0.22] 0.23 (0.01) [0.20, 0.26] 0.27 (0.01) [0.25, 0.29]
Difference to DA 0.00 (0.03) [−0.07, 0.08] −0.00 (0.03) [−0.08, 0.07] 0.00 (0.01) [−0.03, 0.03]
DA 0.18 (0.02) [0.13, 0.23] 0.23 (0.03) [0.18, 0.29] 0.27 (0.01) [0.25, 0.29]
Difference to robot 0.01 (0.02) [−0.06, 0.07] −0.02 (0.03) [−0.10, 0.06] −0.02 (0.01) [−0.04, 0.01]
Pitch
Robot 213.20 (10.31) [191.95, 234.45] 233.45 (8.69) [215.59, 251.31] 267.50 (8.20) [251.10, 283.90]
Difference to human 9.92 (6.23) [−6.06, 25.90] 19.35 (7.33)* [0.58, 38.11] 55.24 (6.08)*** [40.25, 70.22]
Human 203.28 (12.79) [176.95, 229.62] 214.10 (5.85) [202.07, 226.13] 212.27 (6.48) [199.31, 225.23]
Difference to DA 5.59 (8.56) [−16.38, 27.55] 1.81 (4.57) [−9.89, 13.50] 1.46 (3.48) [−7.12, 10.04]
DA 197.70 (7.20) [182.86, 212.53] 212.30 (7.03) [197.84, 226.75] 210.80 (5.79) [199.23, 222.38]
Difference to robot −15.51 (5.67)* [−30.06, −0.96] −21.15 (5.61)** [−35.51, −6.79] −56.70 (5.73)*** [−70.81, −42.59]
Harmonicity
Robot 11.98 (0.55) [10.84, 13.12] 10.40 (0.40) [9.59, 11.22] 10.14 (0.26) [9.61, 10.66]
Difference to human −0.52 (0.29) [−1.27, 0.23] 1.12 (0.31)** [0.33, 1.91] −0.54 (0.17)** [−0.94, −0.13]
Human 12.50 (0.55) [11.38, 13.62] 9.28 (0.54) [8.17, 10.40] 10.67 (0.25) [10.17, 11.17]
Difference to DA −0.02 (0.33) [−0.88, 0.83] −1.42 (0.29)*** [−2.17, −0.67] −0.68 (0.19)** [−1.13, −0.22]
DA 12.52 (0.68) [11.13, 13.91] 10.70 (0.48) [9.72, 11.68] 11.35 (0.28) [10.79, 11.90]
Difference to robot 0.54 (0.26) [−0.13, 1.22] 0.30 (0.26) [−0.36, 0.96] 1.21 (0.19)*** [0.75, 1.67]
Intensity
Robot 66.47 (0.55) [65.33, 67.61] 72.06 (0.56) [70.92, 73.21] 53.59 (0.30) [53, 54.19]
Difference to human 0.83 (0.54) [−0.55, 2.21] 0.93 (0.56) [−0.51, 2.37] 0.31 (0.38) [−0.62, 1.25]
Human 65.64 (0.42) [64.77, 66.51] 71.14 (0.64) [69.82, 72.45] 53.28 (0.43) [52.42, 54.14]
Difference to DA −1.02 (0.45) [−2.19, 0.14] −0.59 (0.55) [−2, 0.83] 0.35 (0.36) [−0.54, 1.23]
DA 66.66 (0.57) [65.49, 67.84] 71.72 (0.59) [70.51, 72.94] 52.93 (0.33) [52.27, 53.59]
Difference to robot 0.20 (0.60) [−1.34, 1.73] −0.34 (0.38) [−1.30, 0.63] −0.66 (0.21)** [−1.17, −0.15]
Energy
Robot 0.62 (0.24) [0.13, 1.11] 0.50 (0.07) [0.36, 0.65] 0.02 (0.00) [0.01, 0.02]
Difference to human 0.16 (0.17) [−0.27, 0.59] −1.28 (1.13) [−4.17, 1.61] −0.19 (0.18) [−0.63, 0.25]
Human 0.46 (0.10) [0.26, 0.66] 1.78 (1.13) [−0.55, 4.11] 0.20 (0.18) [−0.15, 0.56]
Difference to DA −0.27 (0.18) [−0.71, 0.18] 1.03 (1.14) [−1.88, 3.95] 0.19 (0.18) [−0.26, 0.62]
DA 0.73 (0.24) [0.22, 1.23] 0.75 (0.26) [0.21, 1.29] 0.02 (0.00) [0.01, 0.03]
Difference to robot 0.11 (0.07) [−0.07, 0.28] 0.25 (0.24) [−0.36, 0.86] 0.00 (0.00) [−0.00, 0.01]
Duration
Robot 47.33 (10.17) [26.39, 68.28] 19.90 (1.79) [16.23, 23.57] 39.66 (4.35) [30.95, 48.36]
Difference to human −12.02 (9.71) [−36.93, 12.89] −12.33 (3.22)** [−20.56, −4.10] −9.48 (4.08) [−19.52, 0.55]
Human 59.35 (14.04) [30.43, 88.28] 32.23 (3.90) [24.21, 40.25] 49.14 (4.22) [40.71, 57.57]
Difference to DA 13.77 (12.51) [−18.32, 45.87] 10.70 (2.90)** [3.28, 18.11] 10.94 (3.82)* [1.52, 20.36]
DA 45.58 (7.38) [30.39, 60.77] 21.53 (2.41) [16.59, 26.48] 38.20 (3.27) [31.67, 44.73]
Difference to robot −1.75 (5.00) [−14.59, 11.08] 1.64 (1.57) [−2.38, 5.65] −1.46 (3.52) [−10.13, 7.22]
Multiple comparisons were adjusted using Bonferroni correction. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001.
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significant differences within the agents in terms of the
length of the disclosure, compound sentiment, sentimen-
tality, pitch, harmonicity, intensity, energy, and duration
(see Table 2).
Post hoc analyses using Bonferroni correction re-
vealed that people perceived that they disclosed more
information to a human than to a humanoid social robot
and to a disembodied agent. Nevertheless, there were no
significant differences in the way people perceived their
disclosures to a humanoid social robot compared to a dis-
embodied agent (see Figure 7). Moreover, the pitch of
people’s voices was higher when talking to a humanoid
social robot compared to when talking to a disembodied
agent but not compared to when talking to a human (see
Table 3).
3.2.2 Experiment 2
The model was found to be statistically significant, Wilk’s
=Λ 0.08, =p 0.005, suggesting that a difference emerged
in the combined disclosure (in terms of subjective and
objective disclosure) across three agents. The order of the
questionswas found tonot have a significant effect in terms
of the combined disclosure, Wilk’s =Λ 0.72, =p 0.506,
and neither did the interaction of the agents’ treatments
with the order of the questions, Wilk’s =Λ 0.29, =p 0.185.
The agents’ treatments elicited statistically significant
large differences in subjective self-disclosure, length, dura-
tion, pitch, and harmonicity of the disclosure. Moreover, the
agents’ treatments elicited statistically significant medium
to large differences in the disclosures’ compound sentiment.
Univariate tests revealed that the differences within the
agents in terms of the sentimentality, intensity, and energy
of the disclosures were not statistically significant (Table 2).
Post hoc analyses using Bonferroni correction re-
vealed that people perceived that they disclosed less in-
formation to a disembodied agent than to a human or a
humanoid social robot. Nevertheless, there were no sig-
nificant differences in the way people perceive their
disclosures to a humanoid social robot compared to a
human (see Figure 7). Furthermore, people’s disclosures
were longer in the number of words shared and duration
when disclosing to a human than to a humanoid social
robot or a disembodied agent. There were no statistically
significant differences in disclosures’ length or duration
between disclosures to a humanoid social robot and to a
disembodied agent (see Figures 8 and 9).
The pitch of people’s voices was higher when talking
to a humanoid social robot compared to when talking
to a human or to a disembodied agent. No statistically
significant differences in voice pitch emerged when talk-
ing to a human compared to a disembodied agent.
People’s voices were also less harmonious when talking
Figure 8: Length differences between different agent pairs, across
three experiments. The y-axis groups disclosure lengths by experi-
ment number, and the x-axis shows the mean difference between
disclosure length between the two agents indicated in each subtitle.
The error bars represent 95% CI of the mean score of length dif-
ferences between the two agents.
Figure 9: Duration differences between different agent pairs,
across three experiments. The y-axis groups disclosure duration
by experiment number, and the x-axis shows the mean duration
differences between the two agents indicated in each subtitle.
The error bars represent 95% CI of the mean score of duration
differences between the two agents.
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to a human compared to a humanoid social robot or a
disembodied agent; however, the difference in harmoni-
city between people’s voices when talking to humanoid
social robot and to a disembodied agent did not reach
statistical significance (see Table 3).
3.2.3 Experiment 3
The model was found to be statistically significant, Wilk’s
=Λ 0.14, <p 0.001, suggesting that a difference emerged
in the combined disclosure (in terms of subjective and ob-
jective disclosure) across three agents. The order of the
questionswas found tonot have a significant effect in terms
of the combined disclosure, Wilk’s =Λ 0.76, =p 0.056,
and so is the interaction of the agents’ treatments with
the order of the questions, Wilk’s =Λ 0.68, =p 0.322.
The agents’ treatments elicited statistically significant
large differences in the disclosures’ pitch and harmonicity.
Moreover, the agents’ treatments elicited statistically sig-
nificant medium to large differences in subjective self-dis-
closure and in the length of the disclosures, in addition to
a small to medium difference in the duration of the dis-
closures. Univariate tests reveal that the differences within
the agents in terms of the compound sentiment, sentimen-
tality, intensity, and energy of the disclosures were not
statistically significant (see Table 2).
Post hocanalysesusingBonferroni correction reveal that
people perceived that they disclosed more information to a
human than to a humanoid social robot or a disembodied
agent. Nevertheless, there are no significant differences in
the way people perceived their disclosures to a humanoid
social robot compared to a disembodied agent (see Figure 7).
Furthermore,people’sdisclosureswere longer in thenumber
of words shared when disclosing to a human than to a hu-
manoid social robot or a disembodied agent. No statistically
significant differences emerged among disclosure length be-
tween humanoid social robots and disembodied agents (see
Figure 8). In terms of the disclosures’ duration, people talk
longer to a human than to a disembodied agent, whereas
there are no statistically significant differences in disclo-
sures’durationwithindisclosures toahumanoidsocial robot
and ahuman and also to a disembodied agent (see Figure 9).
The pitchof people’s voiceswas higherwhen talking to
a humanoid social robot compared to when talking to a
human or to a disembodied agent. There are no statistically
significant differences in peoples’ pitch when talking to a
human compared to a disembodied agent. People’s voice is
more harmonious when talking to a disembodied agent
compared to a humanoid social robot or a human, and
also it is more harmonious when talking to a humanoid
social robot than to a human. In terms of the disclosures’
voice intensity, people talk louder to a humanoid social
robot than to a disembodied agent, whereas there are no
statistically significant differences in the disclosures’ voice
intensitywithin disclosures to a humanoid social robot and
a human and also within a human to a disembodied agent
(see Table 3).
3.3 The effect of topics of disclosure on
disclosure
Doubly multivariate analysis of variance was conducted
for each of the experiments to determine whether a dif-
ference in disclosure emerged within the different topics
of disclosure (see Procedure, Section 2.6), measured in
terms of subjective self-disclosure and objective disclo-
sure (length of the disclosure, compound sentiment, sen-
timentality, pitch, harmonicity, intensity, energy, and
duration of the disclosures).
3.3.1 Experiment 1
The model was found to not be statistically significant,
Wilk’s =Λ 0.20, p = 0.200, suggesting that a difference
did not emerge in the combined disclosure (in terms of
subjective and objective disclosure) across three topics
(see Section 2.6.1).
The topics of disclosure elicited a statistically significant
medium to large difference in the disclosures’ compound
sentiment. Univariate tests revealed that the differences
within the topics in terms of subjective self-disclosure, the
length, duration, sentimentality, pitch, harmonicity, inten-
sity, and energy of the disclosures were not statistically sig-
nificant (see Table 4).
Post hoc analyses using Bonferroni correction revealed
that people’s disclosures were more negative when talking
about student finances compared to academic assessment
and university–life balance. Nevertheless, there was no
significant difference in the compound sentiment within
disclosures about academic assessment and disclosures
about university–life balance (Table 5).
3.3.2 Experiment 2
The model was found to not be statistically significant,
Wilk’s =Λ 0.21, =p 0.172, suggesting that a difference
did not emerge in the combined disclosure (in terms of
148  Guy Laban et al.
subjective and objective disclosure) across three topics
(see Section 2.6.2). The order of the questions was found
to not have a significant effect in terms of the combined
disclosure,Wilk’s =Λ 0.52, =p 0.133, and sowas the inter-
action of the agents’ treatments with the order of the ques-
tions, Wilk’s =Λ 0.18, =p 0.104.
The topics of disclosure elicited a statistically signifi-
cant large difference in the disclosures’ sentimentality
and a statistically significant medium to large difference
in the disclosures’ compound sentiment. Univariate tests
revealed that the differences within the topics in terms
of subjective self-disclosure, the length, duration, pitch,
harmonicity, intensity, and energy of the disclosures were
not statistically significant (see Table 4).
Post hoc analyses using Bonferroni correction re-
vealed that people’s disclosures were more sentimental
when talking about their intimate and family relation-
ships compared to their social life and leisure time, and
their work and financial situation. In addition, people’s
disclosures were more positive when talking about their
social life and leisure time compared to their work and
financial situation. Nevertheless, there is no significant
difference in the compound sentiment within disclosures
about work and financial situation and disclosures about
intimate and family relationships, and within disclosures
about social life and leisure time and intimate and family
relationships (see Table 5).
3.3.3 Experiment 3
The model was found to not be statistically significant,
Wilk’s =Λ 0.44, =p 0.051, suggesting that a difference
did not emerge in the combined disclosure (in terms of
subjective and objective disclosure) across three topics
(see Section 2.6.3). The order of the questions was found
to not have a significant effect in terms of the combined
disclosure, Wilk’s =Λ 0.76, =p 0.056, and so is the inter-
action of the agents’ treatments with the order of the ques-
tions, Wilk’s =Λ 0.79, =p 0.711.
The topics of disclosure elicited a statistically signifi-
cant medium difference in the disclosures’ compound sen-
timent, and statistically significant small to medium differ-
ences in the disclosures’ length and duration. Univariate
tests revealed that the differenceswithin the topics in terms
of subjective self-disclosure, the sentimentality, pitch, har-
monicity, intensity, and energy of the disclosures were not
statistically significant (see Table 4).
Post hoc analyses using Bonferroni correction revealed
that people’s disclosures were more positive when talking
about their relationships and society compared to their
work–life balance and their physical and mental health.
Nevertheless, there is no significant difference in the com-
pound sentiment within disclosures about physical and
mental health and disclosures about work–life balance.
In addition, people’s disclosures about relationships and
society are longer in length and duration than disclosures
about physical and mental health (see Table 5).
4 Discussion
The study reported here assessed the extent to which
disclosures to social robots differ from disclosures to hu-
mans and disembodied conversational agents. Across
Table 4: Univariate results with disclosure topics as repeated measures treatment
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Topics of disclosure
Variable df F p ω2 df F p ω2 df F p ω2
Subjective
self-disclosure
(2, 50) 2.69 0.078 0.04 (2, 52) 0.37 0.695 −0.02 (2, 120) 0.14 0.870 −0.01
Length (1.47, 44.78) 0.90 0.386 −0.00 (2, 52) 1.68 0.196 0.02 (2, 120) 4.05 0.020* 0.03
Compound
Sentiment
(2, 50) 6.52 0.003** 0.12 (2, 52) 5.29 0.008** 0.10 (1.96, 106.98) 6.61 0.003** 0.06
Sentimentality (2, 50) 2.55 0.088 0.04 (1.64, 42.55) 14.23 0.001*** 0.25 (2, 120) 0.69 0.506 −0.00
Pitch (1.30, 32.56) 0.69 0.448 −0.01 (1.62, 42.07) 1.22 0.300 0.01 (2, 120) 0.61 0.544 −0.00
Harmonicity (2, 50) 0.52 0.597 −0.01 (2, 52) 1.92 0.156 0.02 (2, 120) 0.74 0.480 −0.00
Intensity (2, 50) 0.57 0.568 −0.01 (1.63, 42.42) 0.12 0.848 −0.02 (1.85, 110.78) 2.24 0.115 0.01
Energy (1.60, 40.06) 1.29 0.282 0.01 (1.08, 28.05) 0.72 0.414 −0.01 (1, 60.02) 1.08 0.302 0.00
Duration (1.38, 34.59) 1.39 0.257 0.01 (2, 52) 1.50 0.233 0.01 (1.88, 112.48) 5.35 0.007** 0.05
* = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001.
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Table 5: Estimated marginal means and multiple pairwise comparisons between the topics of disclosure
Variable Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
M ( )SE 95% CI M ( )SE 95% CI M ( )SE 95% CI
Subjective self-disclosure
Topic 1 3.67 (0.31) [3.03, 4.31] 3.73 (0.19) [3.34, 4.11] 3.30 (0.14) [3.03, 3.57]
Difference to Topic 2 0.53 (0.26) [−0.14, 1.20] 0.10 (0.15) [−0.29, 0.48] −0.02 (0.13) [−0.35, 0.31]
Topic 2 3.14 (0.30) [2.53, 3.75] 3.63 (0.13) [3.36, 3.90] 3.32 (0.14) [3.04, 3.61]
Difference to Topic 3 0.05 (0.25) [−0.57, 0.68] 0.02 (0.12) [−0.30, 0.33] 0.07 (0.14) [−0.27, 0.41]
Topic 3 3.09 (0.29) [2.49, 3.69] 3.61 (0.15) [3.30, 3.92] 3.25 (0.15) [2.95, 3.55]
Difference to Topic 1 −0.58 (0.32) [−1.40, 0.24] −0.12 (0.16) [−0.54, 0.30] −0.05 (0.16) [−0.43, 0.33]
Length
Topic 1 120.89 (30.63) [57.80, 183.97] 63.93 (6.26) [51.06, 76.79] 97.39 (9.17) [79.04, 115.73]
Difference to Topic 2 17 (17.50) [−27.79, 61.79] −1.35 (7.72) [−21.11, 18.40] −17.17 (10.60) [−43.29, 8.94]
Topic 2 103.89 (21.34) [59.93, 147.84] 65.28 (7.54) [49.78, 80.78] 114.56 (12.74) [89.07, 140.05]
Difference to Topic 3 10.19 (16.80) [−32.90, 53.29] 12.63 (6.23) [−3.31, 28.57] 28.91 (11.22)* [1.27, 56.55]
Topic 3 93.69 (12.58) [67.78, 119.60] 52.65 (6.40) [39.50, 65.80] 85.65 (6.99) [71.66, 99.63]
Difference to Topic 1 −27.19 (25.85) [−93.51, 39.13] −11.28 (8.55) [−33.16, 10.61] −11.74 (8.65) [−33.03, 9.56]
Compound sentiment
Topic 1 0.76 (0.06) [0.63, 0.88] 0.55 (0.06) [0.44, 0.69] 0.75 (0.04) [0.68, 0.82]
Difference to Topic 2 0.27 (0.09)* [0.03, 0.50] −0.18 (0.06)* [−0.33, −0.03] −0.13 (0.04)** [−0.22, −0.04]
Topic 2 0.49 (0.10) [0.28, 0.70] 0.74 (0.04) [0.69, 0.81] 0.88 (0.02) [0.84, 0.92]
Difference to Topic 3 −0.27 (0.09)* [−0.51, −0.03] 0.06 (0.05) [−0.07, 0.18] 0.15 (0.04)** [0.04, 0.25]
Topic 3 0.76 (0.06) [0.64, 0.89] 0.68 (0.05) [0.58, 0.79] 0.73 (0.04) [0.66, 0.81]
Difference to Topic 1 0.01 (0.07) [−0.17, 0.18] 0.13 (0.06) [−0.04, 0.29] −0.02 (0.05) [−0.14, 0.11]
Sentimentality
Topic 1 0.20 (0.02) [0.16, 0.25] 0.20 (0.01) [0.17, 0.22] 0.27 (0.01) [0.25, 0.29]
Difference to Topic 2 0.05 (0.03) [−0.02, 0.13] −0.03 (0.01)* [−0.07, −0.00] −0.00 (0.01) [−0.04, 0.03]
Topic 2 0.15 (0.02) [0.11, 0.19] 0.23 (0.01) [0.20, 0.25] 0.27 (0.01) [0.25, 0.29]
Difference to Topic 3 −0.04 (0.02) [−0.09, 0.01] −0.06 (0.02)** [−0.11, −0.01] −0.01 (0.01) [−0.04, 0.02]
Topic 3 0.19 (0.02) [0.15, 0.23] 0.29 (0.02) [0.24, 0.34] 0.28 (0.01) [0.26, 0.30]
Difference to Topic 1 −0.01 (0.03) [−0.08, 0.06] 0.09 (0.02)*** [0.04, 0.15] 0.01 (0.01) [−0.02, 0.05]
Pitch
Topic 1 201.96 (8.59) [184.26, 219.66] 215.15 (6.18) [202.44, 227.85] 227.52 (7.52) [212.47, 242.56]
Difference to Topic 2 −0.67 (6.74) [−17.98, 16.63] −7.22 (3.62) [−16.47, 2.04] −0.34 (7.59) [−19.04, 18.35]
Topic 2 202.63 (9.71) [182.63, 222.63] 222.36 (7.15) [207.67, 237.05] 227.86 (7.14) [213.59, 242.13]
Difference to Topic 3 −6.97 (4.73) [−19.11, 5.17] 0.02 (6.17) [−15.78, 15.82] −7.34 (7.27) [−25.23, 10.56]
Topic 3 209.60 (12.54) [183.77, 235.42] 222.34 (7.94) [206.02, 238.66] 235.19 (8.33) [218.54, 251.85]
Difference to Topic 1 7.64 (9.32) [−16.28, 31.56] 7.20 (5.86) [−7.79, 22.18] 7.68 (8.61) [−13.52, 28.88]
Harmonicity
Topic 1 12.16 (0.61) [10.91, 13.41] 9.83 (0.50) [8.81, 10.86] 10.67 (0.27) [10.14, 11.20]
Difference to Topic 2 −0.30 (0.32) [−1.12, 0.51] −0.37 (0.26) [−1.04, 0.29] −0.19 (0.23) [−0.75, 0.36]
Topic 2 12.47 (0.60) [11.24, 13.69] 10.21 (0.46) [9.26, 11.15] 10.86 (0.29) [10.29, 11.44]
Difference to Topic 3 0.09 (0.31) [−0.71, 0.88] −0.14 (0.27) [−0.84, 0.56] .24 (0.21) [−0.27, 0.76]
Topic 3 12.38 (0.59) [11.17, 13.59] 10.35 (0.46) [9.40, 11.29] 10.62 (0.25) [10.11, 11.13]
Difference to Topic 1 0.22 (0.30) [−0.54, 0.98] 0.51 (0.28) [−0.20, 1.22] −0.05 (0.19) [−0.52, 0.43]
Intensity
Topic 1 65.96 (0.50) [64.92, 67] 71.77 (0.54) [70.67, 72.87] 52.25 (0.33) [52.60, 53.90]
Difference to Topic 2 −0.31 (0.62) [−1.90, 1.29] 0.15 (0.39) [−0.86, 1.16] −0.36 (0.36) [−1.25, 0.52]
Topic 2 66.27 (0.56) [65.11, 67.43] 71.62 (0.59) [70.40, 72.84] 53.62 (0.42) [52.77, 54.46]
Difference to Topic 3 −0.28 (0.43) [−1.38, 0.82] 0.09 (0.62) [−1.50, 1.68] 0.69 (0.34) [−0.15, 1.52]
Topic 3 66.55 (0.51) [65.51, 67.59] 71.53 (0.65) [70.19, 72.87] 52.93 (0.32) [52.30, 53.56]
Difference to Topic 1 0.59 (0.58) [−0.89, 2.06] −0.24 (0.47) [−1.46, 0.97] −0.32 (0.27) [−0.98, 0.33]
Energy
Topic 1 0.48 (0.10) [0.28, 0.69] 0.60 (0.08) [0.43, 0.77] 0.02 (0.00) [0.01, 0.02]
Difference to Topic 2 −0.24 (0.17) [−0.66, 0.19] −0.19 (0.26) [−0.85, 0.47] −0.18 (0.18) [−0.62, 0.26]
Topic 2 0.72 (0.25) [0.21, 1.23] 0.79 (0.27) [0.24, 1.34] 0.20 (0.18) [−0.15, 0.56]
Difference to Topic 3 −0.11 (0.10) [−0.14, 0.36] −0.87 (1.13) [−3.77, 2.04] 0.19 (0.18) [−0.25, 0.63]
Topic 3 0.60 (0.24) [0.12, 1.09] 1.65 (1.13) [−0.68, 3.98] 0.02 (0.00) [0.01, 0.02]
Difference to Topic 1 0.12 (0.17) [−0.31, 0.55] 1.05 (1.13) [−1.83, 3.94] −0.00 (0.00) [−0.01, 0.00]
Duration
Topic 1 58.56 (15.17) [27.31, 89.80] 25.40 (2.52) [20.23, 30.58] 41.98 (3.60) [34.77, 49.19]
Difference to Topic 2 7.49 (8.06) [−13.20, 28.17] −0.69 (2.57) [−7.28, 5.90] −6.73 (4) [−16.57, 3.11]
Topic 2 51.07 (9.84) [30.80, 71.34] 26.09 (3.31) [19.30, 32.89] 48.71 (5.19) [38.32, 59.10]
Difference to Topic 3 8.43 (7.54) [−10.93, 27.78] 3.93 (2.03) [−1.26, 9.12] 12.41 (4.17)* [2.15, 22.67]
Topic 3 42.64 (5.25) [31.83, 53.46] 22.17 (2.40) [17.23, 27.10] 36.30 (2.70) [30.89, 41.71]
Difference to Topic 1 −15.91 (12.33) [−47.56, 15.74] −3.24 (2.63) [−9.96, 3.48] −5.68 (3.16) [−13.46, 2.10]
Multiple comparisons were adjusted using Bonferroni correction. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001.
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three laboratory experiments, we provide relatively con-
sistent evidence highlighting that subjective perceptions
of self-disclosures differ from objective evidence of disclo-
sure across three agents. Moreover, the results underscore
differences in the information elicited by the agents’ em-
bodiment compared to the information that is elicited by
the conversational topics.
4.1 Overall disclosure differs by agent, not
topic
The results indicate that, overall, disclosure is influenced
more by an agent’s embodiment than the disclosure
topic. As can be seen in the results across three experi-
ments, differences emerged in the combined disclosure
measures across three agents, whereas no differences
emerged in the combined disclosure across three topics.
This reveals important insights into the role played by an
agent’s embodiment in disclosure settings. It demon-
strates that an agent’s embodiment has wider influence
over what people disclose, and how they disclose it, and
supports the assumption that different agents elicit dif-
ferent types of information. As can be seen in the fol-
lowing key results, agents’ embodiment takes a broader
role in disclosures through the way people perceive their
disclosures, the amount of information that they disclose,
and the way that they communicate it. The results demon-
strate substantial differences in the disclosures’ sentiment
and sentimentality within the topics presented to partici-
pants. This is particularly interesting considering that
while agents’ embodiment influences the way people com-
municate information, the amount of information they
share, and how they perceive their own disclosures – has
little to no influence on the actual content that is shared.
These findings expand on the functionalities of social
robots as a social communication medium [86], and the
attributes of embodiment that contribute to the “rich-
ness” of the medium [35]. The results suggest that even
though the exact content of the questions changed across
experiments, the effect of embodiment on key factors of
self-disclosure endured, while topics only impacted (in
most cases) the sentiment of the disclosure (whether par-
ticipants shared positive or negative information). Ac-
cordingly, we argue that, while the MRT [35] was origin-
ally proposed with respect to CMC, it should be studied
further in HRI settings. Therefore, it can be concluded
that, in line with MRT [35], embodiment is a key factor
for evaluating responsiveness in HRI, as it extends the
abilities of the communication medium [87]. In contrast
to channel activation theory [36], the topics of disclosure
are situational, and while these impact the sentiment and
sentimentally of the disclosed content, they are not as
central in their influence on disclosure as embodiment,
in terms of quantity, perceptions, and behaviour. Never-
theless, it is important to note that, by affecting the senti-
ment and sentimentality of disclosed content, the topic of
the disclosure can frame an interaction in a positive or a
negative way. Content and context also play a substantial
role; like other elicitation procedures and techniques, the
discussed content influences the essence of the informa-
tion that is being shared.
It is also important to remember that interactions
between people and artificial agents are influenced by
multiple factors beyond an agent’s embodiment and the
content of conversation. A recent study demonstrated
that when interacting with a crowd-operated social robot
(where participants knew that real people were talking
via the social robot), more participants reported privacy
concerns in the experimental condition where only their
voice was broadcast to the people operating the social
robot, compared to the group of participants whose voice
and video were seen by the people controlling the robot
[88]. These authors consequently suggest that the re-
cording method (i.e. how much information a robot re-
ceives or records from a person) can also affect people’
responses when communicating with robots. As social
robots are gradually becoming integrated as telepresence
devices [89] and taking an active role in health interven-
tions (e.g. ref. [90]), it will be valuable for future research
to consider additional aspects of interactions with social
robots, including the form of broadcasting and privacy
matters.
4.2 Artificial embodiment requires more
than stimulus cues
The results clearly and unsurprisingly demonstrate that
human embodiment elicits the richest disclosures in terms
of quantity of information shared.Whenparticipants spoke
to another person, their disclosureswere longer, in terms of
number of words and overall duration, than disclosures to
the humanoid robot and the disembodied agent. Moreover,
people perceived that they shared more with the human
conversational partner than with the robot or disembodied
agent. While participants disclosed the most to the agent
that lookedmost like themselves, andwithwhich theywere
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most familiar (i.e. thehumanexperimenter),wedidnotfind
that stimulus cues for embodiment influenced differences
in disclosure quantity and perception between the huma-
noid social robot and the disembodied agent. While the
results clearly demonstrate that people grasp that a huma-
noid social robot is different from a disembodied agent,
such differences in physical embodiment did not result in
differences in amount of information disclosed to these two
artificial agents, or participants’perceptions of the quantity
or quality of disclosure. Questionnaire ratings revealed that
people perceived the humanoid social robot to provide a
richer experience and to have higher agency than a disem-
bodied agent, and yet, such perceptions did not directly
influence their disclosures.
It can be argued that stimulus cues to agents’ embo-
diment are limited to differences in quantity and percep-
tions of disclosure to artificial agents. Considering the
novelty of interactions with artificial agents for most
people (and certainly participants in this study), most
people tend to perceive them as some manner of “black
box” [91] and experience some uncertainty about how to
behave around them. People might require more substan-
tial information than stimulus cues of (human-like) em-
bodiment to treat an agent as more human like [92],
whereas human embodiment naturally addresses some
uncertainties of behaviour [93]; it may be the case that
varying levels of artificial embodiment do not comply to
these rules. Certain behaviours or actions might provide
cues or information that extend from the agent’s physical
embodiment and can support reasoning, mentalizing,
and reacting, accordingly [94–96]. Such attributes can
provide a sense of intentionality and meaning to agents’
behaviour, and would be in line with how humans in-
teract with each other [97].
This finding corresponds to previous reports showing
that reactions to artificial agents, triggered by their human-
like embodiment, are not solely basedonanagent’s physical
features (e.g. human-like body and face, and human-like
gestures) [30]butarealso shapedbyhumanperceivers’prior
knowledge [31,32,34]. Accordingly, we suggest that differ-
ences in quantity and perceptions of disclosure within arti-
ficial agents are inextricably linked to participants’ prior
knowledge and expectations about the robot and disembo-
died agent used here. As such, stimulus cues that endow an
artificial agent with human-like features (such as a body
with two arms and two legs, and a head) are not enough to
trigger people to disclose the same quantity and quality of
information to an artificial agent as they do to another
person.
4.3 Embodiment cues as gestures of
reciprocity
These findings further highlight the role of embodiment
as a cue for disclosure reciprocity [98]. As people ascribe
meaning to agents’ actions [94,95,99], they require sys-
tematic cues to evaluate the agents’ reactions as acts of
reciprocity [100–103]. To disclose information, people
look for social cues in an agent’s embodiment, such as
behaviours or gestures, to assess the agents’ behaviour
and identify its origins [104–106]. When these cues are
limited in conveying an agent’s involvement in an inter-
action [101–103], and fail to achieve sufficient equili-
brium or reciprocity with the human speaker [102], the
speaker is more likely to downregulate their own levels of
disclosure [107], and withdraw from the interaction [102].
The results suggest that the limits to embodiment of the
artificial agents we used here restricted them from pro-
viding sufficient cues of knowledge or understanding
when a person is disclosing information (and that human
listeners naturally perform to signal reciprocity). Accord-
ingly, participants shared less information with artificial
agents and were aware of this fact.
It should be considered that features of embodiment
are dynamic, and while HRI research is often focused on
dialogue and gestures, physical and tangible cues can
also be effective in promoting self-disclosure. A variety
of different physical cues to embodiment serve to signal re-
ciprocation during a conversation, including touch and dy-
namic gaze, and previous work documents how these cues
hold potential to elicit rich disclosures (e.g. [69,108–110]).
Hence, a valuable avenue for further investigation will be to
examine how disclosure reciprocity can be achieved with
variety of embodiment cues, and which of these cues is
responsible for a meaningful elicitation.
4.4 Subjective perceptions align relatively
well with objective data
Subjective perceptions of self-disclosure align relatively
well with the objective data and correspond to observed
evidence of the length and duration of the disclosure.
Across all three experiments, participants perceived that
they shared more with the human listener than with a dis-
embodied agent or a humanoid social robot, and analyses
of speechvolumeandcontent corroborated thisperception.
This finding is especially interesting considering how
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reliably the effects of disclosure length and duration repli-
cated across three experiments, with similar differences in
the number of words uttered and seconds spent talking to
three agents. This contradicts Levi-Belz and Kreiner [53]
findings, and provides evidence supporting the notion
that people’s perceptions of their own disclosures are
formed by observing self-behaviour (in terms of disclosure
volume) and reflecting upon it, rationally [111,112].
It is of note that in Experiment 2, participants retrospec-
tivelyevaluated theirperceptionsof self-disclosuresandper-
ceived that theywere sharingmorewith the humanoid robot
than they actually were (compared to the other agents), in
terms of the disclosure volume. Therefore, we can assume
thatwhen reflecting on interactions retrospectively, it is pos-
sible to lose some of our objectivity and perceive our disclo-
sures in line with the way that we perceive or experience the
agent, and not in amanner that corresponds to actual beha-
viour during an interaction. This finding provides preli-
minary evidence of a retroactive uncertainty reduction reac-
tion [92] when interacting with social robots, and with
artificial agents in general. To explain our own and others’
behaviour after an interaction takes place, we analyse and
self-explain the situation. Once required to recall our own
actions retroactively, we often becomemore prone to cogni-
tive biases and lose objectivity to cues that are easier to ex-
plain than self-behaviour [113]. As time passes from the sti-
muli and more information has been processed, people
experience inconsistency with their memory regarding their
behaviour [114] and form a perception in line with their pre-
conceptions [115]. These, as the results suggest, could be the
agents’ visual features, or perceptions regarding the agents’
experience and agency.
4.5 Differences in disclosures to artificial
agents are manifested in the voice
People’ disclosures differed in communication and speech
patterns according to the agent they were talking to. This
finding matters for a number of reasons. It provides evi-
dence that disclosure extends beyond measurements of
quantity and people’s overall perceptions of disclosure
quality. While differences in disclosure quantity and sub-
jective perception were limited to differences between arti-
ficial agents, information gleaned from participants’ voices
sheds light on a more complicated mechanism. Moreover,
while different topics of disclosure shaped the content
participants spoke about, the agents’ embodiment elicited
different reactions that were manifest in participants’
voices.
It is important to consider basic prosody features for
evaluating patterns of communications, speech styles,
and emotional expression from the voice [44,45]. These
include essential features such as rhythm, intonation,
stress, and tempo of speech, which are conveyed with
changes in pitch, voice intensity, harmonicity, speech
rate, and pauses [44,76,77]. While previous studies in
HRI and social robotics have focused on evaluating inter-
actions on specific distinct processed prosodic patterns
[44] in specific contexts (e.g. ref. [116–121]), the current
findings suggest a standardized method for drawing ex-
plicit causal inferences in voice signal differences across
different agents could be useful. Here, changes in voice
signal values reflected basic differences in voice produc-
tion that were driven by three different agents studied
here, and these can be further processed into prosodic
patterns for evaluating specific speech styles. Moreover,
the experimental design, the voice signal extraction in-
strument, and analytical model can be easily replicated
and applied in different settings and across a variety of
conditions. Thus, the results of the present study provide
empirical insights to changes and variations of voice fea-
tures according to agents’ embodiment. Whereas pro-
cessed prosodic features might provide explanations to
certain distinct behaviours, raw voice signals can demon-
strate variances on a macro level that can be applied to a
variety of measures and be replicated efficiently across
different settings, conditions, and populations.
These changes correspond to, and were likely trig-
gered by, unique features of the agent’s embodiment.
For example, the results of the second and third experi-
ments provide clear evidence for people’s voice being
higher when communicating with the humanoid robot.
This could potentially be triggered by robot’s child-like
embodiment and high-pitched voice. Another interesting
example from the secondand third experiments illustrates
that disclosures to a disembodied agentweremore harmo-
nious. This could be triggered by associating the agent
with pragmatic functionalities to follow simple and well-
known commands, rather than as a sentient conversation
partner. Hence, embodiment does not seem to follow a
linear trajectory, but rather, we see evidence for clear ca-
tegories and sets of features. Different features of embodi-
ment call for different variations of voice signals, different
reactions, and different behaviours.
5 Conclusions
Taken together, the results of this studyhighlight the com-
plexity of extracting meaning from disclosures to social
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robots and artificial agents in general. Current behavioral
(e.g. eye tracking andmotion tracking), performance (e.g.
reaction times and error rates), and physiological (e.g.
heart rate, skin conductance, and respiratory rate) mea-
sures often used in HRI research are prone to variety of
challenges for participants as well as experimenters, such
as discomfort, disruptions, and low temporal resolution
[97]. Here we attempted to address how voice signals can
beusedasnatural behavioural andperformancemeasures
in empirical research, and also as physiological measures
[49–52]. Furthermore, as was demonstrated in this study,
lexical and content features can be extracted from audio
data to provide meaningful insights regarding a disclo-
sure’s volume and essence [37,43,44]. Self-reported mea-
surementsprovide access to one’s subjectiveperceptions to
their disclosure to others, and hold value for expanding on
the cognitive connection between perception and speech
[122,123]. Voice signals, content and lexical features, to-
gether with self-reported measurements, offer a compre-
hensive set of measures with which to evaluate disclosure
to social robots for assessing interactions. Finally, follow-
ing Kreiner and Levi-Belz [37] suggestions, by employing a
multidimensional approach, this study stresses the compli-
cated nature of self-disclosure, where a single measure
cannot capture its complexity and nuance.
These results hold several implications for assessing
interactions with socially assistive robots, and for HRI
research in general. As researchers and engineers work
to develop social robots, agents, and software that rely
upon high-quality verbal input from human users, these
developers would be well served to consider the stimulus
cues to agent embodiment that will lead to optimal eli-
citing of information from human users. Since different
cues to embodiment call for different patterns of commu-
nication, it is important to identify the communicative re-
quirements for the task or agent at hand. Furthermore, the
current results highlight the fact that assessing quality of
interactions in disclosures, especially in assistive settings,
is not purely a matter of the quantity of information.
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